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REPEATED  PRINCIPAL-AGENT  GAMES  WITH DISCOUNTING 
BY  RoY  RADNERI 
In a repeated principal-agent game (supergame) in which each player's criterion is his 
long-run average expected utility, efficient behavior can be sustained by a Nash equilibrium 
if  it  is  Pareto-superior to  a  one-period  Nash  equilibrium.  Furthermore, if  the  players 
discount future expected utilities, then for every positive epsilon, and every pair of discount 
factors sufficiently close to unity (given epsilon), there exists a supergame equilibrium that 
is within epsilon (in normalized discounted expected utility) of the target efficient behavior. 
These supergame equilibria are explicitly constructed with simple "review strategies." 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Some Background 
IN  A  PRINCIPAL-AGENT  SITUATION,  the agent chooses  an action "on behalf of" 
the  principal.  The  resulting  consequence  depends  on  a  random  state  of  the 
environment as well as on the agent's action. After observing the consequence, 
the principal makes a payment to the agent according to a pre-announced reward 
function,  which  depends  directly only on the observed consequence.  This last 
restriction expresses the fact that the principal cannot directly observe the agent's 
action, nor can the principal observe the information on which the agent bases 
his action. This situation is one of the simplest examples of decentralized decision- 
making in which the interests of the decision-makers do not coincide.2 
If  this  action-reward situation  occurs  only  once,  I  shall  call  it  a  short-run 
principal-agent  relationship.  The situation can be naturally modeled as a two-move 
game, in which the principal first announces a reward function to the agent, and 
then the agent chooses an action (or decision function if he has prior information 
about the environment). 
The Nash  (or perfect Nash)  equilibria of such a game are typically inefficient 
(unless the agent is neutral towards risk), in the sense that there will typically 
be another (but nonequilibrium) reward-decision pair that yields higher expected 
utilities to both players. 
In order to increase the efficiency of short-run equilibria, the principal could 
monitor (at least ex post)  the information and decision  of the agent. However 
such  monitoring  would  tyically  be  costly,  so  that  net  efficiency need  not  be 
increased by monitoring. 
Another approach to increasing efficiency is suggested by the theory of repeated 
games. If a game with two  or more players is repeated, the resulting situation 
can be modeled naturally as a game ("supergame") in which the players' actions 
in  any  one  repetition  are allowed  to  depend  on  the  history  of  the  previous 
repetitions.  In the principal-agent situation, the  repetition of  the game would 
l I am grateful to R. A. Aumann, R. W. Rosenthal, and A. Rubinstein for helpful discussions  of 
the topic of this paper, and to A. Rubinstein, J. Mirrlees, and the referees for comments on a previous 
draft. The views expressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
AT&T Bell Laboratories. 
2 The references relevant to the Introduction are gathered in the Bibliographic Notes in Section 9. 
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give the principal an opportunity to  observe the results of  the agent's actions 
over a number of periods,  and use some statistical test to infer whether or not 
the agent was choosing the appropriate actions. The repetition of the game would 
also provide the principal with opportunities to "punish" the agent for apparent 
departures from the appropriate actions. Thus, roughly speaking, the principal 
could  employ  the  analogue  of  a  "statistical  quality  control  chart" to  deter 
"cheating" by the agent. However, since the accumulation of reliable statistical 
evidence  takes time, the threat of future punishment would  be a less  effective 
deterrent the more the agent discounts future utility. 
A formal analysis suggested by the preceding intuitive ideas is carried out in 
the present paper, for the case in which the game is repeated infinitely often. I 
shall show  that the less the players discount  future utility the  closer they can 
approach efficiency with equilibria of the supergame. These equilibria can all be 
achieved by a family of  relatively simple strategy-pairs that I shall call  review 
strategies. Roughly  speaking,  in  a  review  strategy the  principal  periodically 
evaluates the  cumulative performance of  the  agent since  the  last review. If  a 
review results in a satisfactory evaluation, a new review phase is begun; if not, 
the  players  enter a penalty  phase,  after which  a new  review phase  is  begun. 
During each entire review phase the principal pays the agent according to the 
target efficient reward function. During the penalty phases the players revert to 
the short-run equilibrium. A  particular review strategy is characterized by the 
lengths of the review and penalty phases,  and by the criterion for satisfactory 
performance at the times of review. 
I  should  emphasize  that,  by  definition,  the  equilibrium  strategy pairs  are 
self-enforcing,  and  thus  do  not  rely  on  any  binding  contracts or  other  pre- 
commitments. In particular, the agent induces the principal to follow an equilib- 
rium review strategy by threatening to initiate a phase of myopic  optimization 
(short-run equilibrium) following any departure by the principal from the target 
reward function during a review phase. Without such a threat, the principal might 
be tempted to shorten a particular review phase if, for example, the agent had 
already attained  a very high  cumulative performance and  hence  could  safely 
"coast" to the end of the current review phase with minimal effort. 
1.2. Summary of the Main Results 
Let u* and v* be the one-period expected utilities of the principal and agent, 
respectively, corresponding to an inefficient short-term equilibrium, and let u and 
v^  be  respective  one-period  expected  utilities  corresponding  to  an  efficient 
reward-decision pair that is more efficient than the short-run equilibrium (i.e. 
u > u* and  > v*); such an improvement will always exist in the present model. 
Let y and 8 be the players' respective discount factors; then for every E  > 0 there 
will exist  y,  and 8,  less than 1 such that for each (y, 8) with y  y,  and 8  >  86 
there exists an equilibrium of the corresponding supergame that yields the players' 
(normalized) discounted  expected utilities at least u -  E and v -  e, respectively. 
Inrparticular, there will  be  critical discount  factors  above  which  there exist 
supergame equilibria that are strictly more efficient than (u*, v*). 
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In the remainder of this introductory section  I shall discuss some aspects of 
these results more fully, before proceeding to  a more formal presentation and 
analysis of the model.  For this discussion,  however, some minimum of formal 
notation will be helpful. To simplify the exposition,  suppose for the time being 
that both players have the same discount factor, say 8 (0 -  8 < 1). If, for a given 
pair of supergame strategies, the principal's expected utility in period t is ut, then 
his normalized discounted expected utility for the supergame is defined to be 
u=(l-8)E  `  Ut; 
t=1 
a corresponding formula defines the agent's supergame payoff, say v. For each 
8, let  W(8)  denote  the  set  of  pairs (u, v)  of  normalized  discounted  expected 
utilities of the players corresponding to equilibria of the supergame. 
Let  W denote  the set of  efficient one-period  expected  utility pairs. The first 
main result of the paper can be paraphrased as follows:  for every pair (u, v) in 
W that is superior to  (u*, v*),  i.e.,  u> u* and  v>v*,  one  can get arbitrarily 
close to (u, v) with points in W(8), by taking 8 sufficiently close to 1. In addition, 
an explicit construction of such "approximately efficient" supergame equilibrium 
strategies is given, namely the "review strategies" described above. 
1.3. Multiplicity of Equilibria of the Supergame 
For every pair of the players' discount factors, the corresponding supergame 
equilibrium is not unique, provided the discount factors are not too  small. For 
example, the pair of supergame strategies in which each player stubbornly sticks 
to his short-term-equilibrium strategy is a supergame equilibrium, whatever the 
players' discount factors. Thus, for each 8, (u*, v*) is in W(8). In addition, there 
will be many equilibria in review strategies, as described above. Indeed, it can 
be shown that for sufficiently large discount factors the set of equilibria has the 
cardinality of the continuum.  Following  standard terminology,  I shall call the 
mapping from 8 to  W(8)  the equilibrium  utility correspondence. 
For a fixed discount factor 8, a utility-pair in W(8) is called second-best-efficient 
if there is no other utility-pair in W(8) that is at least as large in each coordinate 
and strictly larger in one. It would be of interest to characterize such second-best- 
efficient utility-pairs and the associated supergame equilibrium strategies, but I 
have not attempted to  do  so in this paper. It does  not appear that the review 
strategies alluded to above are second-best-efficient, even though they are approxi- 
mately efficient (and therefore approximately second-best-efficient) for discount 
factors close to unity. This point is discussed more fully in Section 8. 
1.4.  The Case of No Discounting 
It is  natural to  try to  define  a  "limit supergame" as the  discount  factor  8 
approaches  1. One way to do this is suggested by Abel's Theorem, which states 
that 
lim(l-8)  8t-utu=  lim  -E  ut 
8-1  t=1  T-oo  T t=1 1176  ROY  RADNER 
provided the right-hand limit exists. Thus, for the case in which 8 = 1, define the 
principal's supergame payoff to be 
I  T 
lim inf-  E  ut, 
T-oo  T t=_ 
which is well-defined and finite for every bounded sequence (ut), and define the 
agent's supergame payoff analogously. It can be shown (see Section 9) that, for 
the case 8 = 1, the corresponding set W( 1) of supergame equilibria contains every 
efficient pair in  W that is superior to a short-run equilibrium pair (u*, v*). In 
other words, if the players do not discount the future at all, then they can attain 
exact efficiency with supergame equilibria. On the other hand, there will also be 
inefficient supergame equilibrium payoff pairs, e.g., (u*, v*). 
1.5.  A  Continuity  Property 
Taking the two preceding results together, we see that the equilibrium payoff 
correspondence  W(-)  has  a continuity-like property, with respect to  efficient 
payoff pairs,  at  8=  1. This  property of  the  repeated  principal-agent  game  is 
apparently not shared by more general repeated games under uncertainty (see 
Bibliographic  Notes,  Section  9).  Because  of  this  ability to  exploit  long-term 
relationships to increase efficiency, the principal-agent mechanism may be par- 
ticularly important in decentralized organizations. The implications  of this for 
organization theory will be explored elsewhere.3 
1.6.  Outline of the Paper 
Section 2 defines the one-period principal-agent game and reviews those of its 
properties that are relevant to the present paper. Section 3 defines the repeated 
game, and Section 4 desribes a family of review strategies for the repeated game. 
In Section 5 the discounted  expected utilities of such strategies are derived. In 
Section  6,  as  a  preparation  for  the  first main  result  on  equilibria,  I  derive 
information  about  the  agent's  optimal  response  to  a  review  strategy of  the 
principal; in particular I derive lower bounds  on the players' expected utilities 
corresponding to such an optimal response by the agent. Section 7 gives the main 
result on  equilibria for the  discounting  case,  and in particular shows  that the 
principal's optimal response to a review strategy is itself a review strategy. 
To make the exposition less abstract  and thus appeal to the reader's imagination, 
the argument in  Sections  2-7  is developed  entirely in the context  of  a simple 
example  in which the  agent's action is a level  of  "effort," the  stochastic  con- 
sequence  of the agent's action is either success  or failure, and the principal is 
neutral towards risk. The extension of the argument to a more general model is 
sketched in Section 8 and in the Appendix. 
3 For a partial treatment see [15], where the reader will also find other references to the literature 
on theories of economic  decentralization and incentives. REPEATED  GAMES 
References to the related literature, as well  as other bibliographic notes,  are 
gathered in Section 9. 
2.  THE  ONE-PERIOD  GAME 
I shall  start with  a description of  the  one-period  game.  First, the  principal 
announces  a reward function,  cw,  which is a pair of  numbers (wo, wl). Second, 
the agent chooses  an action,  a, which is a real number. Third, there is a con- 
sequence,  which  is a random variable taking on the values  1 ("success")  or 0 
("failure");  the probability of  success is  an increasing function  of  the agent's 
action. Finally, the agent receives a monetary reward, w, or Wo,  according as the 
consequence  of  his  action  is  success  (C = 1) or failure (C =0);  the  principal 
receives  the  remainder,  C -  We. Without loss  of  generality,  one  can take the 
agent's action to be the probability of success, i.e. 
Prob (C = 1)=  a, 
Prob (C = 0) = 1 -a. 
Assume that the resulting utility to the principal is 
U =  C-W, 
and the utility to the agent is 
V=  P(wc)-  Q(a), 
where P  and  Q are differentiable and strictly increasing, P  is strictly concave, 
and Q is strictly convex.  Make the convention that 
P(0) = Q()  = 0. 
It is  typically  realistic to  impose  two  constraints on  the  rewards. The first 
constraint is that the principal may not impose arbitrarily  large penalities on the 
agents; in other words, the rewards are constrained so that the agent's disutility 
is bounded from below. The second constraint expresses the condition that the 
agent is free to refuse to enter into the relationship (i.e., to play the game). For 
this, the rewards Wo  and w, must be such as to enable the agent to achieve some 
minimum expected utility. For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to impose 
a constraint of the first type; the addition of the second constraint would slightly 
complicate the exposition, but would not change the results in any essential way. 
To express the  first constraint, one  can assume that the rewards are bounded 
below  (and that the function P  is finite everywhere); without loss of generality 
I assume that they are nonnegative: 
Co-  (wo, wI)  0. 
Note that it has been assumed that the principal is neutral towards risk, whereas 
the agent is averse to risk. 
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In this game, the principal's pure strategy is the reward function,  co, and the 
agent's pure strategy is a mapping, a, from reward functions to actions: 
a = a(@v). 
An equilibrium of the game is a pair of  strategies, (co*, a*),  such that (i)  co* 
maximizes the principal's expected utility, u = EU, given that the agent uses a*, 
and (ii) a*(co*) maximizes the agent's expected utility, v = EV, given co*. In this 
paper I shall consider only perfect equilibria, in which, for every co (not just co*), 
a*(cv) is an optimal action for the agent given cw.  Thus "equilibrium" is henceforth 
to be understood here as "perfect equilibrium." (See Section 8.3.) 
It is not necessary for the purpose of this paper to give a complete analysis of 
the one-period game. However, an understanding of a few aspects of the game 
will clarify the main issues that are addressed in subsequent sections.4 Given the 
reward function  co,  if the agent chooses the action a his expected utility will be 
(2.1)  v = aP(w,)+  (1-a)P(wo-Q(a), 
and the principal's expected utility will be 
u = a(l-wl)-(1  -a)wO. 
The principal  can achieve  at least  u =0  by taking  w1  = wo=0.  One can easily 
verify from (2.1) that if  w0  = w, the agent will have no incentive to work, i.e., 
a*(w, w) = 0. In addition, one sees from (2.1) that if 
Q'(O)  <PM, 
then  a*(wo, wl) = 0 for  all  w0 and  w, between  0 and  1; in this  case  the  only 
equilibrium has cv*  = (0, 0) and a* = 0. On the other hand, if 
Q'(O)  > P(1), 
then the equilibrium is characterized by 
(2.2)  0=  w* < w* <1, 
a* >0; 
also, a*(O, w1) is strictly increasing in w1 whenever a*(O, w1) is strictly between 
0 and 1. This is the case I shall discuss from now on. 
A pair (co,  d)  is  efficient (Pareto optimal)  if no other pair (co,  a)  yields  each 
player as much expected utility and at least one player strictly more. It is easy 
to see that, for the same level of effort, a, the agent prefers the compensation 
function  (w,  iw) to  the  compensation  function  (w0, w,),  where 
w = aw  +(1-a)wo, 
4Since  the  main  focus  of  the  present paper is  the  repeated  game,  it  is  neither necessary nor 
appropriate here to give a thorough and rigorous treatment of the one-period game. Most of the facts 
about the latter that are alluded to here are discussed more systematically in [2] and in the references 
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whereas the  principal  is  indifferent between  the  two  (recall that the  agent is 
risk-averse and the principal is risk-neutral). Hence,  if [(Wo,  Wi),  a]  is efficient, 
then wo  = w1. Together with (2.2) this shows that an equilibrium is not efficient. 
There are, of  course, many efficient pairs [(w, w), d]; one can verify that for 
0 < a < 1 they are characterized by the condition 
P'(w)  =  Q'(a). 
In  summary,  we  shall  be  concerned  with  an  equilibrium  (o*,  a*)  of  the 
one-period  game that is  inefficient, and for which  there is no  Pareto-superior 
equilibrium. Since (o*,  a*)  is not efficient, it follows  from the structure of the 
one-period game that there is a pair (o,  a)  that is efficient and is strictly better 
than (o*,  a*)  for both players. Thus let  u and  v be the respective one-period 
expected utilities yielded by (6o,  a);  then u>  u* and v>  v*. 
3.  THE  REPEATED  GAME 
I  shall  now  describe  the  infinitely-repeated  game,  or  supergame. Roughly 
speaking, during each period the principal and agent play a one-period  game, 
with a new random environment each time. Each period each player's action can 
depend on what he has observed up to that point in time, his information  history. 
For the principal, this is the history of his own previous actions (i.e., announced 
reward-pairs), and the history of previous successes  and failures. For the agent 
this is the history of his own and the principal's previous actions, the history of 
previous successes  and failures, and the reward-pair that the principal has just 
announced.  Neither player ever observes the random environments, which are 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed. At the end of each period, 
after having observed the current success or failure, the principal compensates 
the agent according to the reward-pair that he announced  at the beginning of 
the period. A supergame strategy for a player is a sequence of decision-rules that 
determine his action at each period as a function of his information history at 
that point of time. The supergame payoff for a player is the normalized sum of 
his discounted expected one-period utilities. 
Here is a more formal definition of the supergame. For t = 1, 2,...,  ad inf., 
let Ot,  be the  reward function  announced  by the principal at the beginning  of 
period  t, let  A,  be  the  action  chosen  by the  agent in period  t, let  C, be  the 
corresponding realized consequence,  and let  Wt  = wt(Ct) be the agent's reward. 
Define, for t  1, 
H  =  (C1,...,  Ct), 
H  A=(1,...,  At), 
H'  = (to,  ..  . ,  tot); 
it is convenient to define  HI  , AA, and H'  to be arbitrary  one-element sets. The 
information available to the principal when he makes his decision in period t is 
(3.1a)  It=  (Hc  l, HT_i), 
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and the information available to the agent when he makes his decision in period 
t is 
(3.1b)  IM  =  (Hc  H',  H A). 
The difference between  I'  and  IP expresses the assumption that the principal 
cannot learn the past actions of the agent. 
A supergame  strategy for the principal is a sequence a = (at) in which ot maps 
the information I' into a reward function wt. Similarly, a supergame strategy for 
the  agent is  a sequence  r=  (rt)  in which  rt maps the  information  IP into  an 
action At. Assume that Ct=  1 or 0, and that 
Prob (Ct = llI'I',  At) = At. 
The realized utilities of the principal and agent, respectively, in period  t are 
Ut=  Ct-  Wt, 
Vt =  P(  Wt) -  Q(At). 
The corresponding discounted expected utilities are 
oD 
u(y)  = (1-)  E  y t  -E  Ut,  0 -- y <  1, 
t=  X 
00 
v(5)  = (I -)  E  at-IEVt,  0-,--<1. 
t=l 
Since the realized utilities in each period are uniformly bounded, the discounted 
expected utilities are well-defined and finite for all the permissible discount factors 
y and 8. 
One can now define (Nash)  equilibrium for the supergame in the usual way, 
namely, a supergame equilibrium  is a pair of supergame strategies (one for each 
player) such that no player can increase his own supergame payoff by unilaterally 
changing his strategy. 
One equlibrium of the supergame is the pair (oC*,  r*) in which, for all  t and 
all information histories, 
0rt(I't)  =@*5 
Tt(I)t)=  a*(wt) 
where (w*, a*)  is the (inefficient) equilibrium of the one-period game that was 
described in Section 2. The discounted expected utilities yielded by this equilib- 
rium are u* and v*. I shall say that the agent optimizes myopically during any 
period in which he uses a*. 
4.  REVIEW  STRATEGIES 
As in Section 2, let (w*, a*) be associated with an equilibrium of the one-period 
game, yielding one-period expected utilities u* and v* to the principal and agent REPEATED  GAMES  1181 
respectively,  and  let  (co,  d)  be  an  efficient pair in  the  one-period  game,  with 
co  = (w', w'), yielding respective one-period expected utilities ui  and v. Furthermore, 
suppose that (co,  d) is more efficient than (co*, a*),  so that u > u* and v > v*. I 
shall now describe a class of sequential strategy pairs, (a,  r), from which equilib- 
rium strategy-pairs in the supergame will be constructed; these strategy-pairs will 
be called review  strategies. (I emphasize that the review-strategies that I construct 
will be equilibria in the space of all strategy-pairs, not just in the space of review 
strategies.) 
Recall that H c=  (C1, . . .,  Ct), and define St =  C1  +  + C.  Recall that 
Prob  (C, =  IIHcL,  A,)  =A 
Prob  (Ct =  OIHc  1,  At) = 1  -At. 
Roughly speaking, a review strategy for the principal pays the agent the reward 
w  during periods 1 through R, whatever the agent's performance during this time, 
and then reviews the agent's cumulated performance, SR. If SR is large enough 
(the agent "passes the review"), then the process is repeated. If SR is too small 
(the agent "fails the review"), then the principal uses the one-period equilibrium 
reward function co*  for M periods, where M is a number to be determined; after 
period  (R + M)  the  process  is  repeated. Passing the  review is  defined by the 
condition 
SR  ,  Ra-B, 
where a is the agent's efficient action, and B is also a (positive)  parameter yet 
to  be  determined. The  quantity q = Ra -  B  may be  interpreted as the  agent's 
quota of successes  during the review phase. Notice that if the agent were to use 
the action a in each period, then the expected number of successes in R periods 
would be Ra, so that B can be interpreted as the "margin of error" in cumulated 
performance that is  allowed  by the principal at the time  of  review. Thus the 
principal's review strategy is determined by the parameters R  (the length of a 
review phase),  B (the allowable margin of error at review), and M  (the length 
of the "penalty phase"). Notice that the "penalty" consists in reverting  to short-run 
noncooperative  behavior  for  some  length  of  time,  so  a better term might be 
"noncooperative" phase. 
If (5, i)  is to be an equilibrium pair of strategies in the supergame, with  C  a 
review strategy, then  (by definition of  equilibrium)  i  must be  optimal for the 
agent given  v.  In particular, it is clear that it will be  optimal for the agent to 
optimize  myopically  (see  Section  3)  against the  reward function  during each 
period  of  a  penalty  phase,  since  the  agent  cannot  influence  the  principal's 
one-period strategies during the remainder  of the penalty phase. Section 6 provides 
further information about the agent's optimal response to v. 
In addition, to further specify the agent's sequential strategy, one must describe 
what the agent would  do if the principal did not pay the agent the (constant) 
reward w at the end of some period during a review phase. In this case, the agent 
optimizes  myopically  during the  remainder of  the  review  phase  and  for  M' ROY  RADNER 
additional periods. (This will also be called a penalty phase.) The number M' is 
another parameter of the pair of review strategies. 
Finally, for completeness  one should specify what each player would do if he 
did not himself follow his own strategy at some previous period. (This specifica- 
tion, which may appear arcane to many readers, will be used to show that the 
equilibrium satisfies a criterion like perfectness; this point will be discussed  in 
Section 8.4.) If the principal does  not pay the constant reward w during some 
period in a review phase, then he will use the reward function  o* during the 
remaining periods  of  what would  have been  the review phase plus additional 
M'  periods.  Otherwise, if  either player has not  followed  his strategy at some 
period,  as  described above,  then  he will  nevertheless continue  to  follow  it in 
subsequent periods. 
In order to give a precise description of the players' strategies, it is desirable 
to have some  notation  for the successive  review and penalty phases,  although 
this  notation  is  somewhat  complicated.  (The reader who  is  satisfied with the 
preceding heuristic description of review strategies can proceed at this point to 
the next section without loss of continuity.) Define: 
(4.1)  q=  aR-B, 
D(l)=min{t:  (,  t  )}, 
H°(l)  = the  event  {SR <  q}, 
H'(1)  = the event {D( 1)  R}, 
N'(1)  =min  (D(l),  R), 
(R+M',  if H(1l), 
N(1)=  R+M,  if H°(1)  but not H(l), 
R,  otherwise. 
Similarly, recursively define for n >  1: 
(4.2)  D(n+  1) =min {t:  t 
> 
N(n)  and w,  c3}, 
H°(n  +  1) = the  event  {CN(n)+  +  ..  +  CN(n)+R  <  q}, 
Hl(n+  1) =the  event {D(n+  1)  N(n)+  R}, 
N'(n + 1) = min {D(n  + 1), N(n)+  R}, 
(N(n)+M',  if H'(n), 
N(n+  1) =  N(n)+M,  if H°(n)  but not HL(n), 
t N(n)  + R,  otherwise. 
The nth review  phase consists of the periods n(n -  1)+ 1,...,  N'(n),  and the nth 
penalty phase, which may be empty, consists  of the periods (if any)  N'(n)+1, 
...,  N(n).  By convention,  N(O) = 0. 
The principal's review strategy cr(R, B, M, M')  is defined by 
(4.3)  t  = 
c  during review phases, 
(4o  during  penalty  phases. 
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The agent's review strategy r(R, B, M, M') is defined to be a sequential strategy 
that is optimal against To(R,  b, M, M')  and, in particular, satisfies 
(4.4)  At = {one-period-optimal  action against  to during penalty phases} 
=  a*(ot). 
(Recall that condition  (4.4) defines myopic optimization.) In addition, the agent 
uses the same strategy in each review period. 
5.  DISCOUNTED  EXPECTED  UTILITIES  FOR  REVIEW  STRATEGIES 
Let the  nth epoch be the periods included  in the  nth review phase,  together 
with the following  penalty phase if there is one.  (In the notation of the end of 
the previous section these are the periods from N(n-  1)+ 1 through N(n).)  The 
beginnings  of  successive  epochs  are points  of  "renewal" or "regeneration" if 
review strategies are used,  in the sense that events within different epochs  are 
statistically  independent.  This  fact  facilitates  the  calculation  of  the  players' 
discounted  expected utilities. 
As in Section 3, for any pair (ao,  r) of review strategies let ( U)  and (V,) denote 
the corresponding sequences of realized utilities for the principal and the agent, 
respectively and let the respective (normalized)  discounted expected utilities be 
denoted by 
00 
u(y)=(1l-y)  E  y()EU, 
t=l 
v(8) =(1-)  E  8'-IEVt, 
t=l 
where y and 8 are the discount factors for the principal and the agent, respectively. 
The normalization factors, (1 -  y)  and (1-  ),  are used to keep the discounted 
expected utilities bounded  uniformly in y and 8, where 0  y < 1 and 0  8 < 1. 
These  are the  natural normalization factors, since  by Abel's Theorem (see  [5, 
Theorem 55, p.  108]), 
1  T 
lim u(y)  = lim -  E  U,, 
y--l  T-oo  t= 1 
l<1 
provided the limit on the right-hand side exists. 
During the  first review phase,  the  principal's  realized  utility  in  period  t  is 
Ct -  W;  during each period of the penalty phase (if any), the principal's expected 
utility is u*. Let 4 denote the probability of  H°(1),  i.e. the probability that the 
agent  fails  the  first review.  By  the  strong  Markov  property, the  conditional 
discounted  expected  utility of the principal from period  N( 1)+1  on, given the 
history of the process  during the first epoch,  is  u(y).  Hence  u(y)  satisfies the 
1183 ROY  RADNER 
equation 
R 
(5.1)  u(y)=(1-y)  E  y'-I(EC  - W)+[R(1--yM)u*  YR+  Mu()] 
t=l 
+(1-  )yRu(y). 
Hence, solving  (5.1) for u(y),  one gets 
R 
(1-  )  E  "-I(ECt--w)+  OR(-l-_M)U* 
(5".2)  u(7)=  U1Mt=  (5.2)  u(y)=R+M  )R 
Similarly, the agent's discounted  expected utility, v(8),  satisfies the equation 
R 
v(8)  =(1-8)  E  6t'-EVt  + 4[R(1-8  M)V*+  S R+w(8)] 
t=l 
+(1-  )S  R(8), 
so that 
R 
(1-8)  E  a'  lEV,+  86R(1-6M)v* 
(5.3)  (5)=  1 
6.  OPTIMAL  REVIEW  STRATEGIES  FOR  THE  AGENT 
In this  section  I  derive some  useful  information  about the  agent's  optimal 
response to a review strategy of the principal. In particular, I derive lower bounds 
on both players' expected utilities corresponding to such an optimal response by 
the agent. These preliminary results have an independent interest in the case in 
which the principal can make a binding commitment to follow  an announced 
review strategy, although this case is not explicitly treated in the present paper 
(however see Section 9). 
For any specification of  R, B, and M, the agent will choose  the strategy r to 
maximize (5.3); call the resulting maximum v(8).  This optimization problem can 
be formulated as a standard dynamic program with a finite set of  states,5 and 
the existence  of a stationary optimal strategy can be demonstrated by standard 
techniques.  However, we  shall need here only  a few properties of the optimal 
strategy. 
Notice  that the agent has only to decide what to do during the review phase. 
One  strategy that  is  available  to  the  agent  is  to  use  the  "efficient" action  a 
throughout the review phase; call this the "good faith" strategy and denote it by 
5 At date t, take the state of the system to be the history of the process during the current epoch. 
A stationary strategy would then use the same strategy within each epoch. 
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r. From (5.3)  one  obtain,  the  following  formula  for the  discounted  expected 
utility to the agent under  A where  k denotes the value of  k under 7: 
A  (1-8R  )A 
+ 
68R(I  _  6M)V* 
(6.1)  v( 6)  i_o,6R+M_(l_  )8 
This formula provides, therefore, a lower bound for the optimal value,  v(8).  It 
will be useful to have in mind the limit of  i^(8) as 8  approaches unity: 
(6.2)  lim  AM(8)=  R+sMv 
Equation  (6.2)  has  an easy interpretation. The expected  length of  the penalty 
phase is OM (if we make the convention that the penalty phase has length zero 
when the  agent passes  review), the expected  length of  an epoch  is  (R + OM), 
and (6.2)  is a weighted  average of  v^  and  v*, with the weights proportional to 
the expected lengths of the corresponding phases. If the expected length of the 
penalty phase can be made small, then v^(6)  will be close to  v^  when  8  is close 
to unity. I shall show that this can be done by an appropriate choice  of  R, B, 
and M  This will imply that v(8)  can be made at least close to v^  when 8 is close 
to unity. 
A precise statement of this result is embodied  in Lemma 6.1 below.  Lemma 
6.2 gives a corresponding result for the principal's expected utility. I shall lead 
up to these lemmas with some preliminary work. 
The next step in the study of review strategies is to derive an upper bound on 
the agent's discounted expected utility. From the convexity and monotonicity of 
the function  Q it follows  that there is a positive  number K  such that, for any 
strategy of the agent, any review period t, and any history Hcl, 
E( VtIHc  1)-v  + K(At  -a)  0, 
or 
(6.3)  E  Vt|Htc l)v+K  (a -At). 
It follows  from this and (5.3) that 
R 
(  v+  (1  )  )K  ,  a  (-  ECt)+  +8(  M* 
(6.4)  v(8) ts1 
Define 
Y  I1-xy  (6.5)  f(x,y)-  E  (1-Xt-1)=Y-  ,  Ox<1. 
t=1  1-x 
Since Ia  -  ECtI  S  1, one can verify that 
R  R 
(6.6)  a  a  -  ECt)=-1  a-ECt)  f(5,R), 
t=1  t=l 1186  ROY  RADNER 
so that 
R 
(6.7)  E  t-'(a--ECt)  -  RRa--ESR +f(8,  R). 
t=1 
Since 
<1  =:Prob (SR<  Ra -B), 
SR  ,  0, 
it follows  that 
(6.8)  Ra-ESR<  Rd+a(l-)B. 
Thus (6.4)-(6.8)  imply that 
(6.9a)  v(8>)  vo(8), 
where 
(6.9b)  v0(8)  (1_  8R)  + p5R( 
-  M)  (1 -3R) 
A48  (1 
M 
+ (1-8)K[4Rd  +(1-)B  +f(8,  R)] 
(1-8R)  + 48R(1j_M) 
Compare this with (6.1), which can be rewritten as 
(6.10)  v( 6) = 
(l'6R)+(p5R(l_5M) 
I shall now specify the following  relations among R, B, and M: 
(6.11)  B=J3RP,  13>0,  I>p<1. 
(6.12)  M=pR,  u>O. 
Define 
(6.13)  k=Var(CtjAt  = d)  d(l-). 
By Chebychev's Inequality, 
(6.14)  A  Rk  k 
(P  -j  '82pR2p-1 
so that k approaches zero as R increases without limit. Hence, from (6.10)-(6.14) 
one sees that v (8) approaches v^(l)  uniformly in R, as 5 approaches 1 (for fixed 
,u, ,B,  and p),  and 
A 
^( 1)  = 
o 
++q,  (6.15)  iv()I---- REPEATED  GAMES 
This is equivalent to  (6.2).  In particular, for every e <0  there exist  Re and  8e 
such that 
(6.16)  vg(8)> v-e,  for R  R,  and 8< 8. 
If in (6.9b) one lets 8 approach unity, for fixed R, one obtains 
v^  + Ov*  + K[oa-  + (1 -  +  )pRP-l] 
(6.17)  vo(l)  =  1+  +t/ 
Let r  be a number, fixed throughout the remainder of the discussion,  such that 
(6.18a)  0<  r<  -  v*, 
and fix /  so that 
(6.18b)  /Lx>, v-  v  -  r7 
With an elementary calculation one can verify that for any positive  e' < r, 
(6.19)  K3R(-*-')-a  +  E 
i(  v- v*E  -  ) -  Ka + KpRp- 
implies that 
(6.20)  Vo(1)  -e'. 
With a slight change in notation, let v3(8,  R) denote the maximum discounted 
expected  utility of the agent, and let 4(8,  R)  be the corresponding probability 
of failing the review. 
LEMMA  6.1:  For every  positive e < 2,7, there exist Re and 8e < 1 such that 8  >  86 
implies that 
(6.21)  v(8, R,)>  v- 
(6.22)  q (8, R)  < e. 
PROOF.  Let Re be a value of R such that Re > Re/4 in (6.16) and the right-hand 
side of (6.19) does not exceed  E, with e'=  e/2.  Let 8e be a value of  8 such that 
8e  >  8'e/4  in (6.16) and such that, for R = Re and 8  8be, 
(6.23)  Iv  o  (l)-  l <  . 
4 
Inequality (6.21) in the conclusion of the lemma follows immediately from (6.16). 
On the other hand, if 8 > 86 and 4 (8, Re) were > E,  then (6.19) and (6.20) would 
imply 
Vo(1)_ v-2 2' 
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which with (6.23) would imply 
(6.24)  vo(8)  v-. 
4 
But v(8, R_)  vo(6), so that (6.24) contradicts (6.21), which proves (6.22), and 
completes the proof of the lemma. 
If the probability that the agent fails the review is small, and B is small relative 
to  Rd, then the principal's utility will be close  to the efficient level most of the 
time. This is formalized in the proof of the next lemma, which shows that review 
strategies yield the principal discounted expected utility close to u if the review 
phase is long enough and if the discount factors of the principal and agent are 
high enough. 
LEMMA  6.2  Let u((y, 6, R)  denote the principal's discounted expected utility 
yielded by review  strategies given R, if the discountfactors of the  principal  and agent 
are y and 8, respectively; then  for every e > 0 there is a y' < 1 such that if R = RE 
and 8  >  86  (as  in Lemma 6.1),  and y  y',  then 
(u  -  EU/tu*-  (a +  RP-')  -  RP- 
u(y,8,R,)  >  -e. 
1+  ek 
PROOF.  First  note  that 
ECt-  =(a-)+(EC-  a) 
=  E+(EC,-a). 
Hence, from (5.2), and writing u(y)  for u(y, 8, R)  and  k for 0(8,  R), 
R 
(1-R)^+r  R(1-yM)u*+(1  -)  E  yt-'(ECt-a) 
t=l 
MU(  =(1  -YR)+  ±byR(1  -M) 
By an argument that parallels the one leading from (6.4) to (6.9b) one can show 
that 
(6.25)  u(y7)  uMo(y), 
where 
(1 -  YR)UA + 
)  YR(1  YM)u*  (6.25b)  uo(y)  (  _R) 
(1  -  yR) + OYR(1  YM) 
(1 -y)[+Ra  +(1-q)B+f  (y, R)] 
(1 -  R) +  7yR(1 -  M) 
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and that for fixed R and 4, 
(6.26)  lim  uo(y)=  uo(1) 
y-1 
u  ++"-a-(  -),8RP-1 
1+  A 
The conclusion  of the lemma now follows  from (6.26) and Lemma 6.1. 
7.  EQUILIBRIUM  REVIEW  STRATEGIES 
In this section I give the main results on equilibria for the case of discounting, 
namely, that efficiency can be approached with equilibria of the supergame as 
the players' discount factors approach unity, and such equilibria can be attained 
with review strategies. These results are stated formally in Theorems 7.1 and 7.2. 
An immediate corollary is that for all discount factors above some critical values 
there are equilibria in review strategies that yield the principal and agent discoun- 
ted expected utilities strictly greater than u* and v*, respectively. 
Recall that a pair of review strategies, (a, r), is characterized by the parameters 
R, B, M, and  M'  (see  Section  3). The relationships  among  R, B, and  M  were 
specified by (6.11) and (6.12), which I repeat here: 
B = fRp, 
M-=,uR, 
where /3, p, and ,u are fixed parameters satisfying 
,8>0,  2<p<1, 
and, from (6.18ab), 
O <  77<  A_-v*, 
Ka 
A  * 
Finally, the agent's review strategy is specified to be optimal against the principal's 
review strategy, and satisfy (4.4). Thus we can adequately denote the principal's 
review strategy by o-(R, M') and the agent's review strategy by r(5, R, M'), which 
represents a natural change of notation from that of Section 3. As in Section 4, 
let i7(y, 6, R) and v(8, R) denote the corresponding discounted expected utilities 
of the principal and agent, respectively. 
Since  it  is  part of  the  definition  of  r(8, R, M')  that  it  be  optimal  against 
o-(R, M'),  in order to show that a particular pair is an equilibrium it is sufficient 
to show that o-(R, M')  is optimal against r(6, R, M').  Sufficient conditions  for 
this will be given in this section. 
By (4.1) and (4.2), if the principal departs from the constant reward c  = (w, w) 
during a review phase, then this action-which  I shall call stopping-initiates  a ROY  RADNER 
penalty  phase.  By  (4.4),  the  agent  optimizes  myopically  against  o,  during 
a penalty phase,  so that it is optimal for the principal to set to = o*  during a 
penalty phase;  hence the second line of  (4.3).  Hence to show that o-(R, M')  is 
optimal against r(6, R, M')  it is sufficient to show that the principal should not 
stop during a review phase. 
For  the  time  being,  let  u(y)  denote  the  principal's  maximum  discounted 
expected utility against r(8, R, M'), and Ht = Hc.  If the principal stops just after 
period  t < R  during the first review phase,  and then follows  an optimal policy 
thereafter, his  discounted  conditional  expected  utility after period  t, given  H,, 
will be 
(7.1)  (1 -  y R-t+M')  *+  R-t+M'(y). 
If the principal continues without stopping from t to the end of the first review 
phase  and  follows  an  optimal  policy  thereafter,  his  discounted  conditional 
expected utility after period t, given H,, will be 
(7.2)  E{(1  -  )(  y  Utn) 
n=l  1 






09  if  SR  ,  Ra  -  B, 
,  if SR  Ra -B, 
By the optimality principle of dynamic programming, u(y)  is at least as large as 
the maximum of  (7.1)  and  (7.2),  so  a sufficient condition  for  o-(R, M')  to be 
optimal is that (7.1) be less than (7.2) for each t = 0,...,  R -  1. 
A feasible strategy for the principal is to use co, = co* for all t; hence 
u(y)  u*. 
Also, in (7.2), 
(7.3)  Un  -w  (n  1,...,  R-), 
so that replacing M(HR)  by M  cannot increase (7.2). Hence (7.2) is as least as 
large as 
(7.4)  -(1  -  R-1)W  +  tR-t(l  -  M)u*+  yR-T+M(y). 
Hence a sufficient condition  for o-(R, M')  to be an equilibrium is that (7.1) be 
strictly less than (7.4), or equivalently, 
7R-t(yM  _ yM'(Y)u yR)((  +)-U*)>)(+U),  for  t=O,...,  R-1. 
Since  u(y) ,  u*,  this  is  equivalent  to 
(7.5a)  yR(yM  -  yM)(U(y)--u*)>(1-  yR)(+  u*), 
(7.5b)  u(y)>  u*. 
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Let us  first investigate the  second  line  of  (7.5).  For this it is  sufficient that 
uo(y)>  u*, where uo(y) is defined in (6.25b);  see the proof of  Lemma 6.2. By 
(6.26), for given 8  and R, this last inequality is satisfied for y sufficiently large, 
provided 
(7.6)  b(8, R)ad+[l-b(8,  R)]f3R`  <1  -u 
This last inequality is satisfied for R sufficiently large, and 8 sufficiently close to 
1 given R, as was shown in Lemma 6.1. 
Let us now examine the first line of (7.5), which (if the second line holds)  is 
implied by 
(7.7)  eM  R  y  (  <  R 
where 
(7.8)  Z(y)  u(y)  -a 
(Keep in mind that uo(y) and Z(y)  also depend  on 8 and R.) Inequality (7.7) 
is satisfied for sufficiently large M' provided that the right-hand side of (7.7) is 
positive, or that 
y(  I +)R 
(7.9)  R  >  Z(y).  I  -ey 
For every R and 8 satisfying (7.6), this last inequality is in turn satisfied for y 
sufficiently close to  1, since, by (6.26), the limit of Z(y)  exists and is positive as 
y tends to  1. 
To summarize the analysis of (7.5), for each 8 and R let r(8, R) be the infimum 
of all y' < 1 such that for all y -  y', both uo(y) > u* (see (6.25))  and inequality 
(7.9)  is  satisfied;  if  no  such  y'  exists  assign  the value  infinity to  r(8,  R).  In 
particular, r(8,  R)  is  finite  (and  less  than  1) for  R  sufficiently large,  and  8 
sufficiently close to 1 given R. In this case, if y>F  r(,  R) there is a number M' 
satisfying (7.7); call the infimum of such numbers MM'(6,  y, R). Thus we have 
demonstrated the first main result. 
THEOREM  7.1:  If 8 and R satisfy (7.6),  y > F(a,  R),  and M'>  MM'(8,  y, R), 
then the review strategies o-(R, M')  and r(8, R, M')  form an equilibrium of the 
supergame. 
The second main result concerns the existence of equilibria in review strategies 
that are arbitrarily  close to efficient for discount factors sufficiently close to unity. 
Note  that (7.7)  is only needed  to  assure that the principal's review strategy is 
optimal against the agent's review strategy, but the discounted expected utilities 
of the players do not depend on M'. ROY  RADNER 
THEOREM  7.2:  For every positive e < 27r there exist Re, 81, and y, such that,  for 
every 5 > 5S, y > y,, and M'>  MM'(8, y, Re), the review  strategies o-(R£, M') and 
r(8, Re, M') form an equilibrium  of the supergame and yield discounted expected 
utilities 
U(y,8,R,)  U-e,  ui(y  ,  RE)  6  - E; 
furthermore,  k(8, R£),  the probability that  the  agent fails  a  review, does  not 
exceed  E. 
PROOF: The  Theorem follows  immediately  from  Lemmas 6.1  and  6.2,  and 
Theorem 7.1. 
COROLLARY:  For all discount  factors above some critical  values there  are equilib- 
ria in review  strategies that yield the  principal  and agent discounted  expected  utilities 
strictly greater than u* and v*, respectively. 
It is of some interest to note that, for equilibria that are close to efficient with 
discount factors close to  1, it is sufficient to take M' proportional to R. To see 
this, write the first line of (7.5) as 
(7.10)  yR  -  M'>  (  R  u)(()-mu  ) 
Under the hypothesis of Theorem 7.2, with s < (u-  u*)/2, 
A  * 
u(y)-  u  = u(8, y, RE)-u  > 
u 
2 
Hence (7.10) will be satisfied if 
(7.11)  yu,e  _  ,M,> 21  Y)  U 
Letting y tend to  1 in (7.11),  one sees that (7.11)  is satisfied for y  sufficiently 
close to  1 if 
(7.12)  M'-  tR  =  KR. 
where K is a number such that 
K  /+u*\  K>2  A  *  . 
uM-Mu* 
One can rewrite (7.12) as 
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8.  GENERALIZATIONS  AND  FURTHER  REMARKS 
8.1.  A More General Model 
Theorems 7.1, 7.2, and 8.1 can be generalized, with relatively minor modifica- 
tions of the proofs, to cases in which (i) the consequences  C, are bounded random 
variables, rather than variables taking on only the values 0 and 1, (ii) the agent 
bases his choice  of action in each period on some (possibly  noisy)  information 
about  the  environment,  and  (iii)  the  principal  is  averse to  risk. The  second 
extension is, of course, important if one wants to apply the results to situations 
in  which  the  principal  employs  the  agent  precisely  because  the  agent  has 
"superior" information in each particular period. The players' utility functions 
need not be additively separable. 
This  more  general  model  contains  as  special  cases  all  of  the  one-period 
principal-agent models  in the literature of  which  I am aware, except those  in 
which the principal can base the agent's reward on partial information about the 
agent's action or the random environment. I believe that the analysis could be 
extended to cover such cases as well, but I have not yet attempted to do this. 
On the other hand, the assumption that the successive  random environments 
are independent and identically distributed plays an important role in the present 
analysis of the supergame, which could not be carried through in general if the 
agent  observed  a  random  event  at the  beginning  of  the  supergame,  and this 
random event remained payoff-relevant throughout the supergame. 
A precise description of the more general model is given in the Appendix. 
8.2.  Review-Strategy Equilibria  Are Not Second-Best 
I have not attempted here to characterize those supergame equilibria that are 
most efficient within the set of equilibria that are attainable with fixed discount 
factors. It does not appear that the equilibria described in Section 7 are in fact 
efficient in this second-best sense. For these equilibria, the agent has a quota of 
successes to fulfill in each review phase, namely q =  Ra -  B. Once the agent has 
fulfilled his quota, he has no incentive to put in any effort during the remainder 
of the review phase. On the other hand, if the agent is too far from the quota at 
some point in the review phase (i.e., St + R -  t < q), then he also has no incentive 
to put in any effort during the remainder of the review phase. 
To induce  the agent to  over-fulfill his quota, the principal could  share with 
him the proceeds from successes over and above the quota. Thus, if St =  q, then 
the agent might receive  Wn  =  wi +fCn, for n =  t + 1, . . .,  R, where f  is a number 
between  0  and  1. To  induce  the  agent  not  to  "give  up"  after  unfavorable 
experience, the length of the penalty phase could be made an increasing function 
of  the  amount  by  which  the  agent  falls  short  of  the  quota,  e.g.,  M = 
mo+  mI(q -  SR),  where mo and ml are positive parameters. These modifications 
would appear to increase efficiency, but it is not known to me whether they are 
sufficient to actually attain second-best efficiency. 1194  ROY  RADNER 
8.3.  Precommitment  by the Principal 
In the one-period game studied here, the principal moves first by announcing 
a reward function, which he is committed to use at the end of the period. In the 
corresponding supergame, these commitments last one period at a time, and the 
principal cannot bind himself in advance to a sequence of two or more reward 
functions. A variation of this game would have the principal move second,  and 
announce  (and pay) the reward after observing the consequence  of the agent's 
action. In the one-period game it would, of course, be optimal for the principal 
to pay the agent nothing, but in the supergame the situation would be analogous 
to the one studied here. The important aspect of the problem studied here, which 
is common to the two variations, is that neither player can make binding commit- 
ments to follow  any particular sequence of one-period strategies. 
One could also consider a variation of the supergame in which the principal 
can enter into  a binding  commitment to  follow  his pre-announced  supergame 
strategy. In this  case the principal would  choose  a supergame strategy that is 
best for him, given that the agent would  optimize against it. Since the review- 
strategy equilibria studied here are not second-best  efficient, the optimal super- 
game strategy for the  principal would  not be  a review strategy. On the  other 
hand, Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 would still be valid for the agent's optimal responses 
to review strategies of the principal, and so optimal equilibria of the supergame 
with  precommitment  by  the  principal  would  also  be  approximately  first-best 
efficient for discount factors close to unity. 
8.4.  Credible Equilibria 
It is known that one must typically impose  some further restriction on Nash 
equilibria of sequential games in order to assure that they will be "credible," i.e., 
that any threats that are implicit in the players' strategies are credible. Space 
limitations  allow  me only  a few remarks here for the already initiated reader. 
For recent discussions,  see [8, 9]. 
One such restriction is sub-game perfectness. The criterion of subgame-perfect- 
ness  in  the  supergame  has  not  been  formally  invoked  here  because,  strictly 
speaking, there are typically no proper subgames after the principal's first move. 
This is implied by the fact that the principal can never observe the agent's actions 
directly, and if A, is never 0 nor 1 then all finite sequences of consequences have 
positive probability. Nevertheless, both the agent and the principal can immedi- 
ately detect any departure from a pre-announced  strategy of the principal. An 
alternative concept of "credible equilibrium" that seems useful in this situation, 
called  sequential equilibrium,  has been  proposed  by  Kreps and Wilson  [9]. In 
fact, one can show that the review-strategy equilibria constructed in Sections 4-7 
satisfy their definition. 
9.  BIBLIOGRAPHIC  NOTES 
In the case of a one-period game, Groves [3, 4] studied a more general decentral- 
ized decision-making situation with several risk-neutral agents and an organizer REPEATED  GAMES  1195 
(principal). Using the assumption of risk-neutrality of the agents, he constructed 
reward functions  that  induce  efficient equilibria.  Early analyses  of  short-run 
principal-agent  relationships  (with  one  agent)  were  provided  by  Spence  and 
Zeckhauser [22], Ross [18], and Mirrlees [12]. For later work see Hurwicz and 
Shapiro [7], Holmstr6m [6], Shavell [23], Grossman and Hart [2], and the many 
references cited in those papers. An early forerunner of this literature was Simon's 
1953 paper on the employment relation [24]. 
The properties of the set of  supergame equilibrium payoff vectors are well- 
understood for the case of repeated games under certainty in which (i) the players 
can monitor the actions of the other players after each one-period game ("perfect 
monitoring")  and  (ii)  the  players  do  not  discount  their future utilities  ("no 
discounting").  In this case, the set of supergame equilibrium payoff vectors is 
the same as the set of feasible,  individually rational payoff vectors in the one- 
period game. (This is the so-called Folk Theorem.) The same conclusion  can be 
derived  for  perfect  equilibria  of  the  supergame;  this  deeper  result is  due  to 
Aumann and Shapley (unpublished) and to A. Rubinstein; see [20] for references 
and a related result. The case  of  perfect monitoring with discounting  has not 
been so well explored; see Kurz [10] and Lockwood [11]. 
Unfortunately, the condition of perfect monitoring is ruled out by the informa- 
tional structure of the principal-agent situation (without additional cost, as noted 
above). I am not aware of any previous treatment of the infinite principal-agent 
supergame with discounting.  For the case  of  no  discounting,  Radner [13] has 
shown that for sufficiently long but finite  principal-agent supergames one  can 
sustain approximate  efficiency by means  of  approximate equilibria. Particular 
infinite principal-agent supergames have been analyzed in a similar spirit, again 
for the  no-discounting  case,  by Rubinstein [19] and by  Rubinstein and Yaari 
[21]. However, the strategies used for the no-discounting case in the above-cited 
literature do not appear to be applicable to the case of discounting. 
The use  of  review strategies permits a more-or-less unified treatment of the 
two cases; for the no-discounting  case one can construct equilibria with review 
strategies in which the review periods are progressively longer. Furthermore, the 
use of review strategies permits a more elementary mathematical analysis. For a 
full treatment of the no-discounting  case, see Radner [16]. 
As mentioned  in Section  1.5, the continuity-like property of the equilibrium 
payoff correspondence  at efficient payoff-pairs, as the players' discount factors 
approach unity,  is  apparently not  a general property of  repeated games with 
imperfect monitoring. An example is provided by repeated partnership games 
(Radner [14]),  for which there are fully efficient supergame equilibria without 
discounting, whereas in the case of discounting the set of supergame equilibrium 
payoff vectors may be bounded  away from efficiency uniformly in the players' 
discountfactors, provided these are strictly less than unity (see Radner, Myerson, 
and Maskin [17]). 
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APPENDIX 
In this Appendix  I sketch the general model described informally in Section 8.1, and indicate the 
corresponding changes in the proofs of the main results of the paper. 
THE  ONE-PERIOD  GAME 
The principal moves  first, announcing  a nonnegative  reward function,  w.  The environment is a 
random variable, X. The agent observes a random variable,  Y, and then chooses  in action, A (the 
agent's move). The consequence,  also a random variable, is 
(A. 1)  C=C(A,X). 
The principal pays the agent 
(A.2)  W=  (C). 
The resulting (stochastic) utilities to the principal and agent, respectively, are 
(A.3)  U = U(C,  W), 
(A.4)  V=  V(A, W). 
The principal's strategy is the same as his move, o. The agent's strategy is a mapping, a, that determines 
his action as a function of the announced reward function and his observation: 
(A.5)  A = a(w,  Y). 
For given strategies w and a,  equations  (A.1)-(A.5)  determine the respected expected  utilities for 
the principal and agent: 
(A.6)  u = EU,  v=EV. 
All of the above data, including the joint probability distribution of X and Y, are common knowledge. 
Assume that the utility functions,  U  and  V, are bounded.  To avoid technical issues  of measure 
theory, it is convenient to assume that X,  Y, and C have only finitely many values. (This assumption 
could be replaced by various regularity conditions;  I omit the details.) 
I assume further that the following situation obtains. There is a (perfect) Nash equilibrium, (w*, a*), 
of the one-period  game, yielding an expected-utility pair (u*, v*); in particular, for each  w  and  Y 
the action a*(w,  Y) maximizes the agent's conditional  expected utility. Since the principal's utility 
is bounded, one can without loss of generality make the convention that Ut 5 O.  Assume that u* > 0. 
Let (6, a)  be  efficient (Pareto-optimal),  with corresponding expected-utility  pair (u^,  vu),  such that 
u^>  u* and v^>  v*. Finally, assume that there is a positive  number K  such that, for any strategy a 
of the agent, if the principal uses w then the corresponding expected utility of the agent and expected 
consequence  satisfy 
(A.7)  (v-v)+K(u-a^)O. 
This assumption states that the set of feasible expected-utility pairs (u, v) is supported at (u, vu)  by 
a line of finite and strictly negative slope, given that the principal uses W. 
THE  REPEATED  GAME 
The repeated game is constructed from the one-period  game just as in Section 3, except that to 
the agent's available information at date t is added the history of observations, HY = (Y,...,  Y,), 
through period t; cf. (3.lb).  The successive pairs (Xt, Yt) are independent and identically distributed. 
Define 
G-  U[  Ct,  (C,)  , 
and note that, for every history Ht,, 
E(GtIHC_  , a,  =  a)  = u. 
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Also, note that Gt is observable by both players. Review strategies can now be defined as in Section 
4, except that SR = G1  +  *  *·  + GR, and the criterion for passing review is SR  >  R^ -  B. Thus, during 
the review phase, the principal gauges the agent's performance directly by his own utility, Gt, rather 
than by the consequence,  Ct. 
From (A.7) it follows  that for any strategy of the agent and any period  t during a review phase, 
(A.8)  E( VtlHC_  )  v^<+  K[u-E(GtlHc_  )], 
which is the analogue of (6.3). Also, note that in (5.2) and elsewhere the principal's expected utility 
during a review period becomes  EGt instead of  ECt -  w. One can replace the inequality preceding 
(6.6) by  u -  EGt  < L. Similarly, (7.3) can be replaced by  Ut+, >0,  and correspondingly in (7.5b), 
(7.8), (7.10), and elsewhere,  + u* can be replaced by u*, which is positive. 
With these changes and corresponding modifications elsewhere, the arguments of Sections 5-7 can 
be carried out in a straightforward manner. 
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